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Abstract 
The recent financial crisis and its consequent distortions have raised a lot of 
issues regarding the safety of the financial system. One of its triggers was the 
excessive risk-taking behaviour that commercial banks have been taking since 
the 80’s which boomed from 2000 on. Regulatory proposals including 
subordinated debt have been increasing since the last quarter of 20th century for 
it provided more direct market discipline. Contingent capital became the focus 
after capital requirements took place, especially with the Basel III Accord. 
 This thesis proposes to examine whether subordinated debt and contingent 
capital, are able to refrain the risk-taking behaviour of both too-big-to-fail and 
non-too-big-to-fail banks. I test the hypothesis that subordinated debt has a 
negative impact on risk-taking behaviour of non-too-big-to-fail banks and no 
impact on too-big-to-fail banks. In addition, I test the hypothesis that contingent 
capital has a negative impact in both non-to-big-to-fail and too-big-to-fail banks. 
I estimate the impact of subordinated debt and contingent capital on risk 
taking-behaviour using a sample of US commercial banks from 1996 to 2013. I 
also include some observed features as controls. Finally, I use instrumental 
variables techniques. 
Findings suggest that subordinated debt has a negative impact on risk-taking 
behaviour of non-too-big-to-fail banks. The impact is also negative for too-big-
to-fail banks. No statistically significant evidence was found about the impact of 
contingent capital on either non-too-big-to-fail or too-big-to-fail banks. However, 
these results must be seen carefully for they might be biased due to instruments 
correlation with the explained variable. They were corroborated by the 
robustness check. 
Keywords: Subordinated debt, Contingent Capital, Risk-taking behaviour 
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Resumo 
A recente crise financeira e suas consequentes distorções levantaram muitas 
questões relativas à segurança do sistema financeiro. Uma das causas foi o 
excessivo comportamento de risco que os bancos comerciais têm vindo a tomar 
desde os anos 80, que explodiu a partir de 2000. Propostas regulatórias, incluindo 
dívida subordinada, têm vindo aumentando desde o último quarto do século 20, 
pois proporcionam uma disciplina mais direta do mercado. O capital contingente 
tornou-se o foco após a introdução dos rácios mínios de capital, especialmente 
com o Acordo de Basileia III. 
 Esta tese propõe examinar se dívida subordinada e capital contingente, são 
capazes de conter o comportamento de risco de bancos não too-big-to-fail e too-
big-to-fail. Testarei a hipótese de que a dívida subordinada tem um impacto 
negativo no comportamento de risco dos bancos não too-big-to-fail e nenhum 
impacto nos bancos too-big-to-fail. Testarei também a hipótese do capital 
contingente ter um impacto negativo nos bancos não too-big-to-fail e too-big-to-fail. 
A estimação do impacto da dívida subordinada e do capital contingente no 
comportamento de risco será feita usando uma amostra de bancos comerciais dos 
Estados Unidos de 1996 a 2013. Incluirei também outras características 
observadas como controlos. Usarei ainda a técnica de instrumentos variáveis. 
Os resultados sugerem que a dívida subordinada tem um impacto negativo 
no comportamento de risco de bancos não too-big-to-fail. O impacto também é 
negativo para too-big-to-fail. Nenhuma evidência estatística foi encontrada sobre 
o impacto do capital contingente em bancos não too-big-to-fail e too-big-to-fail. No
entanto, os resultados devem ser vistos com cuidado, pois podem estar 
enviesados devido à correlação dos instrumentos com a variável explicada. Esses 
resultados foram corroborados por um teste à robustez. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The financial system has perhaps faced no greater challenges than those it 
faces today. In fact, the number of financial institutions collapses had been 
increasing through the 20th century until it exceeded the thousand per year in 
the 90s which harmed many economic players and sometimes tax payers who 
had to absorb losses in case it was a too-big-to-fail bank that needed state 
intervention. Therefore, observers and regulators began to seek ways of making 
the financial system self-regulated in order to prevent future undesired events.  
Following this argument, subordinated debt arose as the main driver capable 
of refraining risk incentives and excessive risk taking, for providing both direct 
and indirect discipline and for its intrinsic features (high sensitivity to changes in 
banks assets’ risk, monitoring incentives and long maturity) and easy 
implementation. If investor worsen their perception of the bank’s risk, the price 
of subordinated debt increases in the market. Economic theory, thus, predicts 
that subordinated debt has a negative impact on bank risk taking. 
However, in the case of too-big-to-fail banks, investors are much less worried 
about failure scenario, since they know that the bank would be rescued by the 
government if it approaches insolvency. This would have an impact on 
subordinated debt pricing and thus prevent market discipline. Subordinated 
debt, then, is not expected to have any impact on bank risk taking. I test the 
hypothesis that subordinated debt has a negative impact on risk-taking 
behaviour of non-too-big-to-fail banks and no impact of too-big-to-fail banks. 
Contingent capital discussion emerged from recent developments on 
proposals and regulations regarding the capital adequacy. Since Basel I in 1988, 
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regulators impose minimum capital ratios to financial institutions. The aim of 
this policy is to keep banks away from a failure zone. Contingent capital is any 
type of security that assumes the shape and behaviour of a debt instrument that 
converts into capital under pre-determined conditions. This way, it is clear that 
it would perfectly fit the purpose of capital adequacy given that whenever capital 
ratios are at stake, debt converts into capital (and debt holders convert into equity 
holders). The prediction regarding the impact of contingent capital on risk taking 
depends on the features of the security itself, especially the conversion ratio (that 
indirectly defines the price of shares in case of conversion). Nevertheless, for 
either non-too-big-to-fail or too-big-to-fail banks, contingent capital is expected 
to lower the riskiness of their assets. Therefore, I test the hypothesis that 
contingent capital has a negative impact in both non-to-big-to-fail and too-big-
to-fail banks. 
This thesis proposes to examine the impact of subordinated debt and 
contingent capital on the risk-taking behaviour in too-big-to-fail and non-too-big-
to-fail banks. To do so, I estimate the impact of subordinated debt and contingent 
capital on risk taking-behaviour using a sample of US commercial banks from 
1996 to 2013. The estimation equation uses a measure of bank risk taking 
(earnings volatility) as explained variable, a measure of subordinated debt and 
contingent capital (ratio of Subordinated Notes and Debentures to Risk-weighted 
assets and the ratio of Convertible debt to Risk-weighted assets respectively) and 
a set of controls (logarithm of total assets, demand deposits ratio, debt-to-equity 
ratio and loan loss provision ratio). 
To do so, I will use instrumental variables techniques while controlling for 
bank and period fixed effects. I will use two measures for risk-taking behaviour: 
the earnings volatility and the ratio of loans past due 90 days to total assets. 
According to the estimation results, subordinated debt has a negative (and 
statistically significant) impact on bank risk-taking behaviour of non-too-big-to-
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fail banks. The results also point out a negative relationship between 
subordinated debt and risk-taking behaviour of too-big-to-fail banks. Thus, the 
results match the theory only by half (it stated that no impact should occur only 
on risk-taking behaviour of too-big-to-fail banks). Regarding contingent capital, 
findings suggest no impact on risk-taking behaviour of both non-too-big-to-fail 
and too-big-to-fail banks. 
The thesis is organized as follows: chapter 2 provides a literature review, in 
which I resume all relevant contributions from preceding authors and regulatory 
developments; chapter 3 provides the main concepts I use in this work and a 
deeper analysis over theory predictions; chapter 4 includes the model 
specifications, data and variables and eventual econometric issues; chapter 5 
presents the estimation results with earning’s volatility as explained variable
while chapter 6 presents a robustness check with the ratio of loans past due 90 
days as explained variable. Chapter 7 concludes.
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1. Subordinated debt and contingent capital as regulation 
instruments 
Subordinated debt and contingent capital are the focus of recent empirical and 
theoretical studies regarding risk-taking behaviour in financial institutions. In 
fact, the riskiness and eventual collapse of banks (especially too-big-to-fail banks 
– hereafter TBTF) have been concerning regulators who seem reluctant to let 
them fail (Flannery 2016). These two instruments provide different regulation 
tools: while subordinated debt has been discussed to be a source of market 
discipline (Flannery & Sorescu 1996), contingent capital, in its turn, could help 
financial institutions remain well capitalized (Flannery 2016; Flannery 2014) or 
avoid government rescues (Hilscher & Raviv 2014). 
2.2. The Basel Accords 
The Basel Accords were a set of three bank regulations proposed by the Basel 
Committee of Bank Supervision whose main goal was providing financial 
institutions and regulators with recommendations regarding the capital, market 
and operating risk. These accords were ratified by more than 100 countries. 
The first agreement (hereafter Basel I) was issued in 1988 and focused mainly 
on capital adequacy and minimum capital requirements. According to the 
riskiness of their assets, banks were ranked into categories and legislation 
prevented those with 8% (or less) risk weight from operating internationally. The 
Basel I was enforced law by G10 in 1992. The second agreement (hereafter Basel 
II) was published in 2004 and it is perhaps the document that matters the most 
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for my article. It is based on three pillars: capital adequacy requirements (already 
discussed in 1988), supervisory review and market discipline, although the 
articulation of these pillars is not clear (Decamps et al, 2004). Nevertheless, these 
authors have shown that, under some circumstances, it is possible to combine 
efforts so that capital adequacy (which literature assumes as the goal of 
contingent capital) could be achieved in the presence of market discipline (which 
the literature assumes as a result of subordinated debt in banks’ capital 
structure). The Basel II triggered the need for contingent capital as it included a 
more strict legislation regarding minimum capital requirements. Following the 
failure of Lehman Brothers, the third agreement (hereafter Basel III) was signed 
in 2009 and published one year later and relied mainly on credit risk. Basel III 
also proposes measures to deal with distressed banks.  
Together with other regulation acts (such as FDIC, mentioned earlier in this 
section) the Basel Accords were the recognition of the financial system 
complexity and, more importantly, the danger it represents to the world 
economy when regulation does not do a proper work. Regarding commercial 
banks, such legislation developments were as either the great exponent of or the 
trigger to authors who focused on subordinated debt and contingent capital role. 
 
2.3. Subordinated debt 
Regarding subordinated debt, Blum (2012) was concerned about the high costs 
taxpayers absorb whenever a bank needs state intervention (Blum, 2002), not 
only because the government channels tax revenues to something that does not 
benefit them directly but also due to the lack of trust in the financial system that 
arises in the event of rescue. Thus, a self-regulating tool that prevents banks from 
failure has been discussed by several authors. According to Blum (2012), the most 
consensual way is to increase market discipline and thus reduce the costs of 
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safety nets) through requiring a minimal amount of subordinated debt issuance 
by banks. Blum (2012) defines subordinated debt holders as the first to bear the 
losses of risky investments while they do not benefit from eventual gains (on 
opposite to shareholders). The only way to attract such investors is to remunerate 
them by assigning a premium as compensation for the high risk they run. 
Blum’s (2012) worries about banks’ failures and its consequences are shared 
by many other authors. The US history was free of any kind of bank regulation 
until 1933, when the Banking Act took place, in part to mitigate the damage of 
1929’s crisis and in part to regulate the financial system. The Banking Act created 
FDIC (Federal Deposits Insurance Corporation) which is an US government 
corporation in charge of supervisory and whose main activity is to provide 
deposits insurance to depositors. Later, in the 80´s, the regulation’s argument 
changed a little bit: instead of a system which is regulated by a neutral institution, 
economists and observers proposed the use of subordinated debt to increase 
market discipline. These new regulatory issues (regarding market discipline) 
became effective with the FDICIA (FDIC Improvement Act) in 1991. 
Kwast et al. (1999) formed an extensive analysis to the proposals of the 80’s. 
They subdivided them into 3 categories (according to content and time). The first 
set of proposals saw subordinated debt as a tool to increase bank’s costs with the 
increase of its risk. The second category arose when subordinated debt started to 
be seen as a signal to the market of the bank’s solvency – the easier the bank can 
issue risky debt, the more solvent it is. The third set was provided by Calomoris 
(1999) – he predicted a way in which banks that fail to issue subordinated debt 
under a certain rate cap, would be somehow penalized, by shrinking 1/24 per 
month (to see more details, consult his work). Kwast et al. (1999) also presented 
a detailed table of several proposals according to the category they are included 
in. 
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Subordinated debt is usually mentioned when market discipline is the subject. 
There is some consensus about its advantages overcoming its disadvantages. 
Firstly, it provides two sources of market discipline - Blum (2002); Goyal (2005); 
Nguyen (2013) - both direct and indirect. Direct market discipline occurs through 
subordinated debt holders’ monitoring the bank’s business - whenever the bank 
increases the riskiness of its assets (and thus investors’ perceived risk), they 
respond by increasing the costs of a new subordinated debt issuance – which 
makes banks’ financing harder and costlier. Indirect discipline occurs through 
regulators supervisory of secondary market yields. Yields of such risky debt 
instrument provides information about the riskiness of the whole bank itself. 
Information regarding the riskiness of bank’s assets is harder to obtain from 
banks’ financial statements or any other accounting information since they are 
not available on a regular basis (or at least as available as market data). Moreover, 
earnings manipulation can hide the true riskiness of the business. Market data, 
instead, reflects investors feelings and instincts which are more reliable given 
that they have direct interest in how the banks’ activity is run. However, there 
are other liabilities capable of providing both direct and indirect market 
discipline (for instance, uninsured certificates of deposits). Kwast et al. (1999) 
highlights three reasons that explain the preference for subordinated debt. 
Firstly, it is the debt instrument that allows investors to better perceive the risk 
of the bank’s business, given its price on the market - the sensitivity of 
subordinated debt price to the bank’s risk is by far greater than any other 
instrument. This risk perception takes us to the second reason: once the investor 
holds the instrument it has the incentive to monitor the bank’s activity, given that 
they bear the losses in the event of default, but they do not share the benefits of 
a potential upward movement of value. Finally, the long maturity of 
subordinated debt instruments does not require bigger banks to constantly issue 
debt instruments, which makes this instrument attractive to big banks who 
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benefit from avoiding burden issuances. Kwast et al. (1999) also points out some 
disadvantages, such as instability on subordinated debt secondary market in 
crisis periods, eventual inability of the bank to increase its capital through 
retained earnings (due to excessive interests) or the moral hazard incentive to 
increase risk after a debt issuance. Nevertheless, the subordinated debt’s pros are 
believed to overcome its cons after all. 
Another important feature which deserves attention is the distinction between 
market monitoring and market influence, two different ways of market 
discipline, according to Bliss & Flannery (2002). Market monitoring refers to the 
way investors truly understand the firm’s condition and reflect it on the debt 
price. If a firm’s condition deteriorates, they penalize it by increasing the required 
yield at which the firm can issue new debt. In contrast, if they perceive an 
improvement in a firm’s environment, they become more willing to lend money 
cheaper than before. Market influence, on the other hand, refers to the ability of 
external stakeholders (supervisors, regulators, investors) to influence the 
management after an adverse event occurred. Bliss & Flannery (2002) point out 
that market monitoring has empirical support, meaning that firms are penalized 
by the market if it feels the business’ riskiness has increased. However, there is 
no evidence regarding the ability of market players to influence management, 
specially either due to asymmetric information (people from within the 
organization are in a better position to make better decisions) or principal-
agent/conflicts of interest (shareholders and debtholders do not converge their 
interests in case the firm’s situation worsens – while shareholders might prefer 
to raise the firm’s risk, for they have little to lose and a lot to gain, debtholders 
fear for their position). 
The most prominent studies about the market discipline of subordinated debt 
present diverging results, which might have happened because they relied on 
different data (Sironi, 2003). Earlier work was based on US banks from 1980s, 
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when market discipline did not take place (Nguyen (2013) suggests that the US 
Congress was keener on regulatory discretion and thus political proposals 
regarding market discipline did not find the necessary support) and thus the 
authors did not find a significant relationship between a subordinated debt 
measure and bank risk - Avery, Belton & Goldberg (1988) and Gorton & 
Santomero (1990). The measure used was the Subordinated Notes and 
Debentures spread which was found not to be influenced by the bank’s risk. 
However, more recent work, using the same approach but a broader sample 
(including later periods of time), was able to find a statistically relevant 
relationship: Subordinated Notes and Debentures spread reacted to changes in a 
set of bank risk measures (Flannery & Sorescu, 1996; and DeYoung et al., 2001). 
The main reason for these diverging results was the regulation system in the 
US which substantially changed in the late 80s. Until then, government 
guarantees, a bailout in 1984 and a TBTF policy assured that banks remained 
under the regulator’s direct control. Avery, Belton & Goldlderg (1988) and 
Gorton & Santomero (1990) based their work on this period, when market 
discipline was needless. However, FDIC’s foundation in 1991 as well as a set of 
huge debenture holders’ losses in the end of 80 decade contributed to a new 
paradigm in which market discipline played a major role, while the policies of 
the previous period were also reverted by FDIC. Thus, it was no surprise that the 
relationship between subordinated debentures and risk intensified in the already 
mentioned studies of Flannery & Sorescu (1996) and DeYoung et al (2001). 
Nguyen (2013) also described another strand of literature that suggests an 
indirect impact of subordinated debt on banks’ risk. As mentioned earlier in this 
section, this indirect impact occurs through supervisory of secondary market 
yields and later use of that information to effectively exercise monitoring over 
the riskiest banks. Thus, for these source of market discipline to work, a liquid 
secondary market is required as well as a good risk perception from investors. 
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Following this approach, Ashcraft (2006) has come to the conclusion that the ratio 
of subordinated debt could help distressed financial institutions recover from 
their desperate situation. Although he studied the impact of subordinated debt 
on troubled banks solely, Ashcraft (2006) pointed out an interesting issue: if a 
bank is in such a critical condition, its subordinated debt issuance must be strong 
enough to offset the negative impact of having more leverage than before the 
issuance (which, ceteris paribus, deteriorates its already bad risk profile). This 
offsetting is achieved by reducing the moral hazard between the parts, since the 
existence of a moral hazard problem would prevent investors from trusting 
distressed banks. In this case, Ashcraft (2006) expects both parts to overcome the 
moral hazard issue: the bank because it has incentives to reduce it (given the 
complicated position) and the potential investors because they protect 
themselves by including restrictive covenants in the issuance contract. He also 
tested whether there is empirical evidence supporting this theory or not and 
concluded positively. Another relevant study that fits the implications of an 
indirect market discipline did not find evidence of an effective relationship 
(Krishnan et al., 2005) contrasting with the work of Ashcraft (2006). Moreover, 
they also tested whether the issuance of subordinated debt provided preventive 
risk reducing (i.e. banks which know they will issue subordinated debt in a near 
future – one quarter - reduce the riskiness of their assets before the issuance) but 
again found no evidence and thus failed to find any kind of indirect market 
discipline. 
Nguyen (2013) resumes four hypotheses in order for subordinated debt to 
have an effective market discipline, based on earlier work. Firstly, debtholders 
must have access to all the information they need to assess the bank’s risk. 
Otherwise they are not able to penalize a bank whose risk has increased or 
reward another in case it has reduced the riskiness of its investments. Therefore, 
the regulator has a decisive role in guaranteeing that banks report its true 
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condition. Secondly, it is essential that regulators have the authority to impose 
the necessary corrections upon receiving of information from secondary market, 
or even be given the necessary tools to prevent harmful events from occurring. 
Thus regulators must be provided with sufficient power to proceed with these 
duties. In addition, market discipline could be seriously called into question if 
the relationship between subordinated debt holders and the bank is not held at 
arm’s length or if there is any mechanism to strengthen the bank’s risk profile 
other than the bank itself in the case it falters. These could lead to a lack of trust 
in one of the parts. Moreover, more sophisticated investors work better in an 
environment that ensures a true and fair relationship with financial institutions. 
Finally, the absence of regulatory and state intervention to save distressed banks 
is also crucial. If investors know ex-ante that a bail out will take place in the event 
of default, for instance, market discipline could be seriously compromised. For 
these reason, subordinated debt is expected to have a little disciplinary effect on 
TBTF banks, whose failure entails negative consequences to the whole economy. 
Nguyen (2013), in his turn, assumed a different approach from the previous 
studies. Instead of examining whether a bank risk measure changes with changes 
in subordinated debt contracts yields, he chose to examine the impact of a 
measure of subordinated debt on a measure of bank risk – he concluded that 
subordinated debt exercises influence on bank risk under some circumstances 
and furthermore, he tested (with positive results) whether the intervention of the 
regulator and the existence of a legal system accordingly to the requirements of 
subordinated debt to discipline banks is relevant or not. In fact, the set of 
conditions provided above proved to be of such importance in order to allow the 
self-discipline system to work out. 
 
 28 
  
2.4. Contingent capital 
Contrasting with subordinated debt, contingent capital has not received much 
attention at least until very recently (the Third Basel Accord, in 2010, introduced 
some proposals regarding the financial system and financial institutions’ 
capitalization which triggered observers attention to new instruments capable of 
keeping banks well-capitalized). In fact, keeping banks well-capitalized could 
prevent them from spreading potential losses to investors (Flannery, 2016). Bank 
capital in the form of equity is by far the most trustful mean of absorbing losses 
and protect creditors from bearing the costs of a recent downfall. One might think 
that the issuance of new equity would solve the banks’ capitalization problem, 
although regulators find it difficult to force banks to issue new equity, for several 
reasons. Firstly because issuing equity is more expensive than issuing debt (in 
the US, firm’s creditors are paid before shareholders which makes the latter 
require a higher rate of return). Thus, based on the Pecking Order Theory 
(Eldomiaty et al. 2017), firms are reluctant to new equity issuances. Secondly, and 
following the general idea of the Pecking Order Theory, issuing equity sends a 
negative message to the market – investors, in the absence of any further 
information, realize that the new equity issuance is always the second choice and 
only occurs after the failing of the first one, meaning the bank is in trouble. In 
addition, in the case the bank is in a bad condition, shareholders are reluctant to 
invest more money in it by buying more equity, following the Risk-Shifting 
theory: Li et al. (2017). Shareholders would prefer to get into a situation where 
others run the risk and they benefit from an eventual upward movement. In fact, 
the closer the bank is to fail (and leveraging is still available), the more attractive 
risk investments seem to shareholders, once they have little to lose and 
everything to gain from them (in the unlikely scenario of success, they can 
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improve their condition and benefit from it while if things go as expected, they 
lose the very few they already had). Calorimis (2013) also refers the dilution costs 
that would arose to existing shareholders if new underpriced equity was issued. 
In the case the management believes that shareholders are overvalued, investors 
would recognize the real motivations behind the issuance and would penalize 
the shares price immediately after the issuance. Finally, the issuance of equity 
would burden the bank and shareholders with tax-inefficiency. Therefore, an 
instrument that prevents the bank from (or corrects) an eventual fall of equity 
value has been discussed since the last great financial crisis, triggered in 2008. 
Flannery (2016) demonstrates a type of debt that assumes the shape of contingent 
capital, which he defines as “debt obligations (that) would convert into common 
stock if the issuer's capital ratio fell below some pre-specified value”, meaning, 
in other words, a type of debt that converts into capital whenever the bank 
approaches failure. This would require debt-holders to become owners of the 
bank itself after the conversion is made, which in theoretical terms, is a directly 
and automatic replacement of debt for equity, thus bringing equity back to 
normal levels. What regulators seek is the safety of depositors and tax payers (i.e. 
they want unsecured debt holders and equity holders to absorb potential losses). 
By relying on contingent capital securities, they assure not only this goal but also 
that contingent capital holders do not get penalized by tax inefficiency. 
Another main advantage of this security is that it would reduce the probability 
of default and does not require regulatory actions since it is a re-capitalization 
self-mechanism. Hilscher & Raviv (2014) also predicted a reduction of default 
probability if the bank issued contingent capital when compared to a 
subordinated debt issuance. They presented 3 scenarios of three different banks 
with the same amount of equity or equity equivalent, one of which consisted of 
a bank with equity and contingent capital, another one with equity and 
subordinated debt and the third one that was an all-equity bank. They 
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demonstrated that the all equity bank and the bank with a contingent capital 
issuance were those with lowest default probability. This is explained by the 
stabilizing effect contingent capital provides: whenever things worsens, i.e. 
whenever assets suffer a loss, a capital provision had been already made and thus 
an absorbing mean of losses is triggered. In the case of an all equity bank, 
absorbing mean of losses is already available. Note that subordinated debt is the 
least desirable of the three instruments if the bank pursues a low default 
probability (which indirectly depends on its risk, although it was not the goal of 
their study). 
Nevertheless, this resolution does not benefit old shareholders who share the 
cost of an eventual downfall with contingent capital bondholders. Flannery 
(2016) describes the situation as a reduction of call option maturity over the 
bank’s assets. In fact, shareholders’ decision can be seen as a call option that as 
value, at maturity, if assets exceed liabilities. Ceteris paribus, the longer the 
maturity of a call option the more value it has to its holder (higher time 
premium). Prompt re-capitalization would shorten the maturity of this call 
option because the conversion is triggered before the maturity of debt. 
Even though I will not focus on contingent capital features, I will resume the 
most important ones: trigger and conversion ratio. As we will see later, 
conversion ratio might assume a key role regarding the risk incentive that comes 
from contingent capital securities.  
The trigger is what sets the conversion out. According to Calorimis (2013), the 
trigger should be sufficiently clear in order for investors and agencies to evaluate 
them and thus assess the bank’s real risk. Therefore, an alternative in which 
contingent capital securities have a trigger that depends on the will of the 
management is not appropriate. So, should the conversion trigger rely on book 
values? Basel agreements (which will be presented later in this section) base the 
capital requirements on book values.  Although it provides a more accurate 
 31 
resolution, book values are still object of management manipulation and thus 
they are not the best alternative. Calorimis (2013) identifies two market-base 
measures that are a potential conversion trigger: CDS (credit default swaps, a 
type of insurance against a bond payment fail) spreads and stock price 
movements. They discarded CDS once they are also not completely free of 
manipulation and due to the fact that its price is a little bit inert in response to 
risk change. Therefore, an equity value indicator (based on stock price) is 
Calorimis (2013) chosen trigger because it is the one that fits all 
recommendations. Market-based triggers are also proposed by Albul, Boris et al. 
2015), who also pointed out that stock prices are much less susceptible to 
manipulation, since market players who have incentives to delay the conversion 
are not able to artificial change stock prices.  
Glasserman & Nouri (2012), however, propose a trigger based on the book-
value capital ratios, recognizing there are also good arguments in favour of book-
value triggers. Their contribution to the literature was the use of a partial 
conversion instead of a full conversion, which enables the bank to convert the 
exact amount of debt to capital to meet the minimum capital requirement and 
leave space for further conversions. Hischer & Raviv (2014) use on their model a 
trigger based on the value of assets, which they assume to be exogenous in the 
sense that it is a pre-determined variable (the initial assumption is assuming that 
assets value is given by V). Given that capital ratios are the practical solution for 
the problem (and the one most used in real life), they mention that their model 
could also be adapted to a capital-ratio trigger. 
The other important feature of a Contingent Convertible security and perhaps 
what investors are more interested in is the conversion ratio, the number of 
shares received at the time of conversion for each convertible security, or, as 
Hilscher & Raviv (2014) denominate them, “the percentage of the ownership in 
the post-conversion financial institution that contingent capital holders receive”. 
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This is of high importance in the sense that it directly determines the new equity 
structure of the bank. Hilscher & Raviv (2014) studied the influence of the 
conversion ratio on risk incentives. In their model, they have shown not only that 
the presence of a contingent convertible security has a negative impact on risk-
taking behaviour but also that shareholders behave differently depending on 
how many shares do those convertible bond securities give place in case of 
conversion: they have incentives to increase the riskiness of the business when 
the conversion ratio is low – the equity value they gain for reducing debt at 
conversion overcomes the equity value they lose due to dilution costs (the entry 
of new shareholders reduces the bank share of old shareholders and thus their 
power to control it). In contrast, a high conversion ratio causes high dilution costs 
(so high that the equity value gain due to debt decrease is not sufficient to 
overcome the first effect). For intermediate levels, i.e. for a moderate conversion 
ratio, incentives are inconclusive. Note that the conversion ratio is the par value 
of the bond divided by the conversion price which makes Conversion ratio and 
conversion price vary on opposite directions. 
The literature does not provide much work regarding the empirical impact of 
contingent capital on risk-taking behaviour. In fact, I found only two articles that 
attempted to assess whether a measure of contingent impacts banks’ risk-taking 
behaviour, but neither of them used U.S. as data source. Berg and Caserer (2011) 
tried to test the relationship between contingent capital securities’ returns and 
changes in the implied volatility of put options on Lloyds’ shares. They found 
that, in contrast with straight bonds, contingent bonds have a negative impact on 
the implied volatility with an even higher magnitude. According to them, this is 
explained not because of the instrument details, but because it is designed to 
transfer the wealth from contingent capital holders to shareholders at the time of 
conversion and thus have an incentive to increase the assets’ risk. This occurs 
mainly because the market sets high conversion prices (or low conversion ratios) 
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which enables the shareholders to impose the losses to the contingent capital 
holders at conversion. This effect is much less significant with low conversion 
prices (or high conversion ratios). 
The other article is assigned to Grossman & Imai (2013) who tried to assess the 
empirical relationship between the amount of contingent capital and risk-taking 
behaviour on British banks in the pre-World War I period. Despite the fact that 
economic, financial, political and even geographic conditions were much 
different at that time, this article’s approach is similar to the one I will present 
later. At the end of the ninetieth century, the most popular way of keeping banks’ 
capital above the minimum requirements was through adding to common shares 
an extended liability, meaning that a common shareholder also carries a part of 
the bank’s liability (and, as a consequence a share of an eventual downfall in the 
earnings). The rationale behind is making shareholders bear part of the losses 
and thus avoid scenarios such as risk-shifting. Grossman & Imai (2013)’ 
contribution was a mechanism in which equity subscribers that did not pay for 
the shares at issuance carry a contingent liability for the unpaid portion, the 
uncalled capital which can be called by the bank at management’s discretion. 
These should be enough for shareholders to restrain their risk propensity since 
even if the management never exercises the call option, the threat of such an 
event would make the shares less liquid which should increase shareholders’ 
incentives to monitor the bank’s risk more actively. Their results corroborated 
the theory. 
In contrast, many authors studied the relationship between shareholders’ risk 
incentives and contingent capital, but only from a theoretical point of view. Here, 
I highlight one article, from Martynova & Perotti (2015), who found 
mathematical evidence of risk restrain in the presence of contingent capital. 
Despite that it provides sufficient risk prevention (meaning that in terms of loss 
absorption, they are both efficient), they state that only pure equity ensures fully 
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recapitalization under all scenarios - contingent capital converts into debt only in 
case of failure and are subject to trigger limitations which could cause a 
distressed bank no to recapitalize.  
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Chapter 3 
Concepts and theoretical framework 
3.1. Concepts 
In this chapter I will address the main concepts I will use in my analysis. 
Starting with bank risk, I define it as the riskiness of its assets, which is, in turn, 
the long-run result of the bank’s investments today. This definition is broadly 
taken in the literature (used by Goyal (2005) for instance). The riskier the bank’s 
investments, generally the riskier its assets and thus the less realizable they are 
(meaning that the likelihood of its recovering - totally or partially – is smaller). 
Therefore, the less realizable the assets of an institution, the more risky it is. 
Regarding subordinated debt, there is also consensus in the literature – 
observers use the financial definition and so will I. Subordinated debt is the type 
of debt that ranks below all other debt funding sources. In other words, in case 
of borrower’s liquidation, subordinated debtholders are the last to be paid – if a 
bank declares bankruptcy, it will use its assets to pay taxes, senior and normal 
debt holders and only after, subordinated debt holders. Thus, it is not difficult to 
verify that such a security carries more risk than all others and so, subordinated 
debt holders are paid with a higher premium. However, subordinated debt is 
issued by contract, meaning that some banks might not have issued this type pf 
security (they finance their business with secure debt and secure debt only). 
Finally, following Hilscher & Raviv (2014), I will define contingent capital as 
a deb security that converts into capital if assets fall below a predetermined 
threshold. Also, if we could “build” an instrument that completely fulfils this 
definition, whenever the assets of a bank decrease under a certain level, the 
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trigger is pulled and part of its debt is converted into capital, bringing the bank 
to a “well-capitalized” status. 
3.2. Economic theory predictions 
As all we know economic theories do not always have empirical support, 
although they have much explanatory power. This happens because some 
economic theories rely on the relationship between a variable and another, 
isolating all the other factors capable of influencing them (ceteris paribus). Thus, 
depending on the data, variables and estimation processes used, empirical 
studies might either corroborate or deny the authors predictions. 
 Concerning subordinated debt, theory suggests it has a restraining power 
on bank risk taking, given the market discipline it exercises (through market 
monitoring and market influence). In fact, as the above mentioned literature 
shows, and despite the scepticism of some authors, market discipline has been 
discussed to replace direct monitoring with benefits for everyone (again, I refer 
above its main advantages with evidence from other authors). The empirical 
tests, then, should examine the validity of the following hypothesis: 
H1 Subordinated debt has a negative impact on risk-taking behaviour of non-
too-big-to-fail banks. 
 However, in the case of a TBTF bank, the market influence is not expected to 
be exercised. In fact, if investors do not expect to be penalized in case of 
bankruptcy, they no longer demand the premium they would if failure was a real 
scenario. Therefore, there would be no distinction between senior debt yield and 
subordinated debt yield, making the discipline impossible. Furthermore, 
regulators would not be able to use the information provided by the secondary 
market. The theory then, suggests no impact of subordinated debt on a risk-
taking behaviour. Then, the empirical teste should examine the following 
hypothesis:  
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H2: Subordinated debt has no impact on risk-taking behaviour of too-big-to-
fail banks. 
As for contingent capital, no prediction can be made unless we know the exact 
features of the contract and how it is implemented. Take for instance the example 
of a Contingent Convertible Bond: its impact on risk-taking behaviour depends 
on the maturity, the conversion ratio and the threshold in the first place. As Berg 
& Caserer (2011) pointed out, a low conversion ratio puts contingent capital 
security holders at stake because shareholders know that they now have 
someone to share the losses in case of distress. They also show in a single example 
that shareholders are better off when assets are slightly below the trigger, 
meaning they have incentives to increase risk until they reach that point. On 
opposite, if the conversion ratio is set high, then shareholders would come up to 
a point where they lose the bank’s control after conversion. However, this 
analysis is made by comparing one bank that has contingent capital to another 
that does not have. Generally, for two banks that have already issued contingent 
capital, it is expected that the one with higher risk-taking behaviour is penalized 
by investors. Thus, the test should examine the following hypothesis: 
H3: Contingent capital has a negative impact on risk-taking behaviour of non-
too-big-to-fail banks. 
In contrast with subordinated debt, contingent capital holders do not get 
harmed if the bank increases its risk (or even gets close to insolvency), as it 
happens with subordinated debt. They know that if the bank approaches failure, 
the trigger is pulled and it recovers to normal debt and equity levels. This is true 
for both non-too-big-to-fail and too-big-to-fail banks. Thus, I expect no difference 
in the relationship between contingent capital and risk-taking behaviour in both 
cases. The hypothesis to be tested is the following: 
H4: Contingent capital has a negative impact on risk-taking behaviour of too-
big-to-fail banks.  
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Chapter 4 
Methodology 
4.1. Model specifications 
In this sub-chapter, I will present the model and the estimation procedure I 
will use to assess the impact of subordinated debt and contingent capital on risk-
taking behaviour. Market discipline has been discussed mainly by regressing the 
spread of subordinated debt yields of the market on bank risk measures. This 
does not fit my purpose though – I intend to examine if there is any market 
discipline by assessing the impact of the subordinated debt amount on measures 
of bank risk. In order to do so I will follow the approach of Nguyen (2013) who 
used a regression where the explained variable was a bank risk measure, the 
main explanatory variable was a ratio whose numerator was the amount of 
subordinated, controlling for a number of other explanatory variables. I will also 
introduce, as main explanatory variable, a variable that measures contingent 
capital in the model, which constitutes my contribution to the literature. As 
discussed above, Grossman & Imai (2013) also took a similar procedure 
regarding contingent capital. I will teste the impact of these 
 The model will consist of an estimation equation that regresses bank risk-
taking on measures of subordinated debt and contingent capital in normal and 
TBTF banks.  
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4.2. Data and Variables 
I will contemplate an explained variable that mathematically measures bank 
risk-taking (it is in accordance with the financial definition of risk), which deals 
with the uncertainty of a potential outcome – the variation that could occur 
around the expected value of return, or, in other words, the volatility of the 
bank’s earnings. Following Nguyen (2013)’s approach, I consider as bank’s 
return the earnings before taxes and loan loss provision. Therefore, in order to 
measure the variation that could occur to the bank’s earnings I use the ratio of 
standard deviation of the earnings (computed over a moving window of 4 
periods) to the average total assets (also computed over a moving window of 4 
periods). This variable will be mentioned hereafter as Earnings Volatility EV). As 
Nguyen (2013) also mentions, this is the measure less subject to manipulation as 
it is very close to the standard deviation of the return of assets given that it does 
not include the loan loss provision (which highly depends on lawyers and 
experts reports) and taxes. 
In addition to the main model I will also present a robustness check in which 
I build a model whose explained variable is defined as the ratio of accruing loans 
past due 90 days to total assets (LPD90/TA). This approach was set by Flannery 
& Sorescu (1996) and is based on a broader risk concept. In fact, having accrued 
loans whose reimbursement is past due might indicate potential problems (more 
specifically, short-run liquidity problems). The use of 90 days refers to a signal of 
impairment considered by audit firms. In fact, the net realizable value of an asset 
is subject to a decrease when it is past due 90 days (depending on professional 
judgement). Therefore, it is expected that, in absence of any other factors, the 
more the loans past due 90 days, the more problematic is the bank’s condition 
and thus the riskier it is. 
Concerning subordinated debt, and again following Nguyen (2013)’s 
approach, I will use the amount of Subordinated Notes and Debentures (SND), 
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since they truly replicate the features of subordinated debt as defined above. In 
order to make this measure comparable among banks, I update the measure by 
using the ratio of Subordinated Notes and Debentures to risk-weighted assets 
(RWA). Not only does it allow us to compare different banks regarding basic 
features (such as size, core business or geographical dispersion), but also banks 
who are similar in basic features but have different assets risk. 
The measure of contingent capital is much less clear. In fact, it is not possible 
to measure it by analysing the banks’ financial statements unless the bank 
specifies a note with that purpose. Therefore, I had to address this issue by 
finding bank securities that have similar market behaviour. One way of solving 
the problem would be artificially computing the amount of these securities by 
subtracting a version of common equity tier 1 capital from total tier 1 capital, thus 
isolating all securities that are part of tier 1 capital but are not included in 
common equity tier 1, which should be what I mean by contingent capital. 
However, as we will see later in the following section, information regarding tier 
1 capital and its subdivisions might or might not be disclosed (it is up to the 
bank). Moreover, the composition of common equity tier 1 differ from bank to 
bank which makes it inefficient to reach each bank’s contingent capital security 
amount this way. The help of an expert who works as Financial Economist for 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York led me to a variable (Convertible Debt – 
CD) that includes a debt security that will convert into common or perpetual 
preferred stock in lieu of cash payments. The great disadvantage of this measure 
is that it might also include simply delayed equity issuances (triggered by date, 
with other covenants like changes in control, for instance). The frontier between 
debt and capital is not so well defined here. I leave the definition of a better 
measure for later and further discussion. 
As the objective of this thesis is to evaluate whether there is any market 
discipline through subordinated debt and contingent capital on both TBTF and 
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non-TBTF banks, I must distinguish them. Thus I will use a dummy variable that 
assumes the value 1 whenever the observation refers to a TBTF bank and zero 
otherwise. Therefore, by multiplying this variable for both regressors, I will be 
able to assess the impact of subordinated debt and contingent capital on risk-
taking behaviour of TBTF banks. Following the US legislation I use $ 50 billion 
as the TBTF threshold. 
Regarding the bank-level control variables, I follow Goyal (2005) who stated 
that the bank charter value is capable of influencing the risk incentives of banks 
(through economic benefits that they obtain from charging rents in competition 
protected markets). Therefore, I use the ratio of demand deposits to total deposits 
(DD/TD) as a proxy for bank charter value. Almost all the literature emphasizes 
the use of two other controls: size (measured as the logarithm of total assets – 
ln(TA)), since it is highly believed that bank’s risk depends on its size, and loan-
loss provision ratio (measured as the ratio of loan-loss provision to net interest 
income – LLP/NII, following Nugyen (2013). Finally and in accordance with 
Hilscher & Raviv (2014), I will use another variable that controls for the 
indebtedness of the bank – the debt-to-equity ratio. As referred above, not only 
excessive debt might cause risk-shifting, but also does it make the bank closer to 
a potential conversion trigger (in case it has contingent capital). 
The estimation equation can be resumed as follows: 
ܧ ௜ܸ௧ =  ߚ0 + ߚ1 ቀ
ௌே஽
ோௐ஺ቁ௜௧ + ߚ2 ቀ
ௌே஽
ோௐ஺ቁ௜௧ כ ܶܤܶܨ௜௧ + ߚ3 ቀ
஼஽
ோௐ஺ቁ௜௧ + ߚ4 ቀ
஼஽
ோௐ஺ቁ௜௧ כ
ܶܤܶܨ௜௧ + ߚ5 ቀ
஽஽
்஽ቁ௜௧ + ߚ6 ln(ܶܣ)௜௧ + ߚ7 ቀ
௅௅௉
ேூூቁ௜௧ + (
஽
ா)௜௧ + ݒ௜ + ݑ௧ +  ߝ௜௧, 
 
where ቀௌே஽ோௐ஺ቁ௜௧ denotes the ratio of Subordinated Notes and Debentures to Risk-
weighted assets of bank i in quarter t, ቀ ஼஽ோௐ஺ቁ௜௧ denotes the ratio of Convertible 
debt to Risk-weighted assets of bank i in quarter t, TBTF denotes a dummy 
variable that assumes the value 1 whenever the observation refers to a too-big-
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to-fail and 0 otherwise, ቀ஽஽்஽ቁ௜௧  denotes the demand deposits ratio of bank i in 
quarter t , ln(ܶܣ)௜௧ denotes the logarithm of total assets of bank i in quarter t, 
ቀ௅௅௉ேூூ ቁ௜௧ denotes the loan loss provision ratio of bank i in quarter t, (
஽
ா)௜௧ denotes 
the debt-to-equity ratio of bank i in quarter t. v and u are variables that control 
for bank fixed effects and quarter fixed effects, respectively. We will see further 
details about these variables in the following chapter. E it denotes the error term 
associated with the bank i in quarter t. 
Financial information on the above variables was collected from Wharton 
Research Data Services. The raw data refers to 12,360 US commercial banks from 
1985:1 to 2016:4 (32 years) on a quarterly basis. Each observation is defined as 
bank-quarter in the estimation exercise. 
Regarding the raw data, I made two assumptions/changes. Firstly, I deleted 
banks that were systematically below the 300 million assets limit. I did this to 
exclude from the analysis the micro banks in US economy given that they assume 
less financial literacy and thus are less likely to transact securities such as 
contingent convertible bonds or subordinated notes and debentures. I did this 
for practical reasons since the above number of banks within the 32 years range 
made estimation difficult. Then I assumed that whenever a bank does not report 
values for a variable in a given period it is because its book-value is zero or near. 
I leave for further discussion the reasonability of these assumptions. After 
introducing these changes, the final number of banks was 4,025 within a time 
range from 1996:1 to 2013:4 (18 years). 
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4.3. Econometrics issues 
Many econometrics issues arise when we plan to explain the risk of a financial 
institution or at least intend to examine whether there is any market discipline 
through subordinated debt or contingent capital. One of them is the potential 
regressors’ endogeneity. In fact, regarding subordinated debt, Nguyen suggests 
there might be some endogeneity, due to the fact that subordinated debt 
issuances are much more likely to occur in safe banks, given that it is not 
mandatory yet. Ignoring this would result in biased results (the coefficients 
would be biased due to the potential causality problem). To address this issue, I 
will use instrumental variables techniques. The choice of the instruments also 
relies on Nguyen (2013)’s work. They must be correlated with subordinated debt 
and not correlated with risk-taking behaviour. The author stated that equity-to-
assets ratio (E/A) could be one of the instruments, once it is expected that higher 
equity-to-assets ratio banks are further from failing than lower equity-to-assets 
banks, thus making this ratio a good candidate for the first instrument, for it 
indirectly assumes a correlation between subordinated debt and this ratio. I don’t 
expect this ratio to be correlated with the risk-taking behaviour. While, on the 
one hand it seems true that higher debt deteriorates this ratio (thus indicating a 
potential relationship), banks could still improve its assets independently from 
its debt and the same applies for equity. Potential tax benefits could also 
influence the choice for subordinated debt through interest cost deduction. 
Ceteris paribus, the higher the tax rate, the higher the tax benefits. There are safe 
and risky banks independently from the location (where tax rate is applied). Thus 
I don´t see why tax rate should be correlated with risk-taking behaviour. Effective 
tax rate is, then, the second instrument. The third instrument’s purpose is to 
control for other factors within the industry that could interfere with a bank’s 
choice for subordinated debt. I will use the ratio of Subordinated Notes and 
Debentures of other banks to risk-weighted assets in the data (once they all 
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operate in the same industry – U.S. commercial banks market). The subordinated 
debt of other banks could influence the bank to decide to increase its own 
subordinated debt issues. I don’t find any relationship between other bank’s 
subordinated debt amount with the bank’s risk-taking behaviour. 
In order to reduce the requirements for the instruments, I will also include two 
sources of fixed effects. On the one hand, I will use quarter fixed effects. This 
allows me to control for every variable that varies across time (t) and remains 
constant across banks (i), for instance, GDP, tax rate, interest rate and any other 
macro variables. On the other hand, I will also use bank fixed effects which 
allows me, in its turn, to control for every changes across banks (i) that do not 
change across time (t), for instance, headquarters, branches’ location and so on. 
Given that the objective of the thesis is to examine whether subordinated debt 
and contingent capital impact the risk taking-behaviour of a financial institution, 
and given that they are similar in their nature, I expect an endogeneity problem 
also in contingent capital. Thus, I will use another instrument - contingent capital 
instruments of other banks in the same industry (the US banking industry).  
Another issue present on Nguyen (2013)’s work is the potential influence of 
the choice of reporting Tier 1 capital on banks’ quarter reports. Some observers 
pointed out that risk-taking incentives could shift after banks report their true 
capital ratio. Nguyen (2013) addressed this issue and concluded that there is no 
correlation between the choice of reporting Tier 1 capital and risk incentives after 
the report is disclosed which makes me comfortable about using data with banks 
that do report Tier 1 capital (otherwise, an alternative could be taken - using a 
different denominator other than risk-weighted assets given that it is computed 
based on Tier 1 capital ratio). See Nguyen (2013) for further details. 
Niu (2008) did some theoretical work on whether banks prepare themselves 
for debt issuances (specially subordinated debt issuance), thus constraining their 
risk taking after the issuance, or not. A positive answer would obviously bias our 
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results since an external factor, present in the error term, would be influencing 
the answer the model seeks. Therefore, it is important to assess if banks take some 
decisions that allow them to reduce the riskiness of their assets before they issue 
subordinated debt. His work showed no positive trend regarding risk incentives 
but due to the complexity of the problem (and having in mind that was not his 
main focus) he left the issue for further research, which takes us back to Nguyen 
(2013) who addressed it, having found no evidence about assets risk reduction 
before subordinated debt issuance. 
Goyal (2005) and Flannery & Sorescu (1996) pointed out a heteroscedasticity 
problem in regressions that included risk-taking behaviour variables. They did 
not specify the origin or source of this problem even though it is a standard 
practice in the literature. Therefore I will also compute heteroscedasticity-
adjusted standard errors, instead of default/normal standard errors. 
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Chapter 5 
Empirical application 
5.1. Data description 
This section presents the summary statistics of the variables used in the model. 
They are shown in Table 1: 
Variable Mean Median Min Max St. dev.
EV 0.006 0.005 >0.000 1.238 0.012
SND/RWA 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.643 0.008
CD/RWA >0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 >0.000
TBTF (Y/N) 0.009 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.095
SND/RWA * TBTF >0.000 0.000 0.000 0.064 0.002
CD/RWA * TBTF >0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000
ln(TA) 13.027 12.815 7.690 21.411 1.287
DD/TD 0.128 0.111 0.000 1.000 0.104
D/E 9.720 9.885 -61372.420 12466.750 144.151
LLP/NII 0.088 0.046 -2.311 53.259 5.331
E/A 0.101 0.092 -0.128 0.998 0.052
Average tax rate 0.251 0.314 -749.091 342.400 2.611
SND of other banks/RWA 660.104 422.955 0.070 754728.700 4541.389
CD of other banks/RWA 1.637 0.000 0.000 1606.852 10.972
E/A * TBTF 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.448 0.011
Average tax rate * TBTF 0.003 0.000 -6.242 4.033 0.044
SND of other banks/RWA * TBTF 0.014 0.000 0.000 8.275 0.181
CD of other banks/RWA * TBTF 0.000 0.000 -0.064 0.012 0.002
 
Table 1: Summary statistics of the main model 
Note: all specifications are based on 192.675 observations 
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We can state that the average bank has an earnings volatility of 0.006, a 
Subordinated Notes and Debentures to Risk-weighted assets ratio of 0.001 and a 
Convertible debt to Risk-weighted assets ratio between 0.000 and 0.001. 0.9% of 
the observations refer to a too-big-to-fail bank.  Regarding the book values, the 
average bank has USD 367.692 million of total assets, a demands deposits ratio 
of 0.128, a debt-to-equity ratio of 9.720 and a loan loss provisions ratio of 0.088.  
Table 1 also provides information regarding the instruments I will use to 
address endogeneity. The average bank has an equity-to-assets ratio of 0.101480 
and faces an average tax rate of 0.251. The ratio of Subordinated Notes and 
Debentures to Risk-weighted assets of all banks other than the average bank is 
660.104 and the ratio of Convertible debt to Risk-weighted assets all banks other 
than the average bank is 1.637. 
One thing that might seem odd, is the extreme range that the average tax rate 
assumes. In fact, it has a minimum of -749.091 and a maximum of 342.400 (the 
values are not percentages). However, this dispersion occurs because the taxable 
income does not match the net income (since taxable income settlement does not 
follow the same rules as the accounting). It might happen that a bank has 
deferred tax assets (that are a consequence of an accounting costs that was not 
recognized as cost by the tax authority in previous quarters) or liabilities 
(following the same rationale). 
 
5.2. Preliminary analysis 
I will use a graphical approach to provide a preliminary answer to my research 
question. This preliminary analysis examines the relationship between 
subordinated Notes and Debentures and earnings volatility and Convertible 
Debt and earnings volatility of both too-big-to-fail and non-too-big-to-fail banks. 
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Thus, analysing the relationship of these two variables and earnings volatility, 
we have that: 
 
Figure 1: Preliminary analysis of the impact of SND/RWA on EV 
 
 
Figure 2: Preliminary analysis of the impact of CD/RWA on EV 
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Figure 3: Preliminary analysis of the impact of SND/RWA * TBTF on EV 
 
 
Figure 4: Preliminary analysis of the impact of CD/RWA * TBTF on EV 
 
In order to have a better idea of the trend line and the scatter results 
themselves, I decided to expurgate outliers from the graphs. To do so, I defined 
as axis maximum the percentile 99.99%. Outliers falling outside this range do not 
show up in the above figures. The line reflects the linear trend line. 
Preliminary analysis suggests interesting results. Figure 1 shows a positive 
relationship between Subordinated Notes and Debentures and earnings 
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volatility, which means that, apparently (and apparently only), there is no market 
discipline. This result might be caused by the absence of other variables that 
could interfere with this relationship (for instance size). Figure 3 does not change 
this trend. In fact, too-big-to-fail banks seem to have risk incentives in the 
presence of this kind of instruments, which after knowing the relation specified 
in Figure 1 is not quite a surprise – if normal banks assume riskier investments 
under subordinated debt financing, why would not a too-big-to-fail bank do so? 
Concerning contingent capital, Convertible Debt does not seem to have a 
defined relationship. We cannot highlight any positive or negative trend. Again, 
other variables that are missing in this analysis could interfere with this 
relationship (for instance debt-to-equity ratio). 
5.3. Estimation results 
Model estimation results are presented in Table 2. Specification (i) follows an 
OLS estimation which uses as explanatory variables the ratio of Subordinated 
Notes and Debentures to Risk-weighted assets (alone, assuming that the 
marginal and separate impact on earnings volatility is constant, and together 
with TBTF dummy, assuming that the marginal and separate impact on earnings 
volatility depends on whether the bank is too-big-to-fail or not) and the ratio of 
Convertible debt to Risk-weighted assets (again, alone and together with TBTF 
dummy). 
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  Specifications     
EV  OLS  IV    
  (i)  (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 
SND/RWA  0.085***  2.913*** 6.689*** 7.381*** -2.665*** 
  (0.007)  (0.700) (1.080) (1.399) (0.482) 
CD/RWA  -0.945***  -436.974*** 0.000 0.000 -32.471 
  (0.014)  (84.785) (0.008) (8.878) (22.933) 
SND/RWA * TBTF -0.021**  -2.790*** -3.397*** -3.519*** -0.061 
  (0.098)  (0.648) (0.643) (0.784) (0.272) 
CD/RWA * TBTF 0.743**  429.628*** 0.000 -28.513 14.925 
  (0.006)  (85.028) (0.003) (69.043) (19.985) 
ln(TA)     -0.010*** -0.012*** >0.000 
     (0.002) (0.002) (>0.000) 
DD/TD     0.024*** 0.022*** -0.006 
     (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) 
D/E     >0.000 >0.000 <0.000 
     (0.000) (>0.000) (>0.000) 
LLP/NII     <0.000 <0.000 0.000 
     (0.000) (>0.000) (0.000) 
Quarter-fixed effects No  No No Yes Yes 
Bank-fixed effects No  No No No Yes 
        
R-Squared  0.003      
Overall F-Test  54.89***      
Endogenous variables 
correlation test 
       
     SND/RWA    230.255*** 86.339*** 91.847*** 8.620*** 
     CD/RWA    55.999*** 71.555*** 16.6948*** 5.870*** 
     SND/RWA * TBTF    6556.530*** 3158.360*** 403.943*** 177.290*** 
     CD/RWA * TBTF    3.244*** 1313.390*** 2.822*** 0.940 
Overidentification test   85.183*** 9.544*** 34.571*** 27.040*** 
 
Table 2: Estimation results of the main model. All specifications are based on 192,675 
observations. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** denote significant at 
1%, ** denote significant at 5* and * denote significant at 10%. Endogenous variables correlation 
test examines if the instruments are correlated with each of the four endogenous variables. The 
overidentification test examines if the instruments are correlated with the error term. For 
specifications (ii), (iii) and (iv), the test is score chi squared and for specification (v), the test is the 
Hansen J test. 
 
The results from specification (i) suggest a statistically significant positive 
relationship between subordinated debt and risk-taking behaviour in non-too-
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big-to-fail banks. H1 is, then, rejected. That relationship is estimated to also be 
positive in too-big-to-fail banks (0.085-0.021>0 and it is statistically different from 
zero), which seems contradictory to the theory, H2 is rejected. The relationship 
between contingent capital and risk-taking behaviour is estimated to be negative 
for non-too-big-to-fail banks, which confirms H3 (-0.945<0). The relationship is 
estimated to be negative also in too-big-to-fail banks (-0.945+0.743<0 and it is 
statistically different from zero). H4 is accepted. 
The very controversial and not applicable to real word assumptions that OLS 
requires made it compulsory to change to an IV regression. As discussed above, 
the explanatory variables are believed to be endogenous. A proper way of 
addressing the issue is by using instrumental variables techniques, which leads 
us to specification (ii). It follows an instrumental variables approach, using the 
same variables than in specification (i) and the already mentioned instruments 
(see bottom of Table 1) to address the endogeneity of the Subordinated Notes and 
Debentures to Risk-weighted assets ratio and Convertible debt to Risk-weighted 
assets ratio. Specification (ii) suggests again that subordinated has a statistically 
positive impact on risk-taking behaviour of non-too-big-to-fail banks. H1 is still 
rejected. The impact is also positive in too-big-to-fail banks (2.913-2.790<0 and is 
statistically different from zero). H2 is still rejected. Concerning contingent 
capital, its impact on risk-taking behaviour of non-too-big-to-fail banks is 
negative which validates H3. The impact is also negative for non-too-big-to-fail 
banks (-436.974+429.628<0 and is statistically different from zero. H4 is accepted. 
One important analysis is the one that tests the validity of the instruments. As we 
can see in Table 2, the instruments are correlated with the endogenous variables, 
which is a good indicator. However, the Overidentification test shows that they 
are also correlated with the explained variable (risk-taking behaviour). Thus, we 
must analyse this results with caution.  
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We have already identified the need for control variables. There might be some 
factors present in the error term of specification (ii) that could change the impact 
and magnitude of explanatory variables. That need is overcome in specification 
(iii), in which we can verify that, in comparison with specification (ii) the 
magnitude of coefficients for subordinated debt increases (but there is still a 
positive impact on risk-taking behaviour of non-too-big to fail banks – H1 is 
rejected. The impact is also positive for too-big-to-fail banks (6.689-3.397<0 and is 
statistically different from zero). H2 is also rejected. As for contingent capital, the 
impact on risk-taking behaviour is estimated not to be statistically significant in 
non-too-big-to-fail banks which rejects H3. The same result is found for too-big-
to-fail banks. H4 is rejected. Until now, results do not corroborate the theory. 
Although this is not a problem by itself, I had to make sure that all endogeneity 
is vanished from the model. In order to examine if instruments were correctly 
applied, we will use fixed effects in specifications (iv) and (v). The tests to the 
instruments variables remain the same. They are correlated with the endogenous 
variables but they are also correlated with the explained variable. Again, results 
should be biased and must be analysed with caution. 
Specification (iv) adds quarter-fixed effects. The results show again no 
difference in the impact of subordinated debt on risk-taking behaviour too-big-
to-fail banks. The impact on risk-taking behaviour of too-big-to-fail banks is also 
positive (7.381-3.519>0 and is statistically different from zero). The hypothesis H1 
and H2 remain rejected. In comparison with specification (iii) the impact of 
contingent capital on risk-taking behaviour remains not significant for non-too-
big-to-fail banks – H3 is still rejected. There is also no evidence regarding the 
impact for too-big-to-fail banks (0.000-28.513<0, but it is no statistically different 
from zero) which rejects H4. Regarding the instruments tests, the same 
conclusion should be taken as in the previous specifications. 
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Specification (v) adds bank-fixed effects to control for variables that vary solely 
across each estimation dimension (as mentioned in the previous section). After 
controlling for these sources of endogeneity, I am comfortable with the results of 
specification (v). They finally show a negative impact of subordinated debt on 
bank-risk taking of non-too-big-to-fail banks, which validates H1. The impact is 
also negative for non-too-big-to-fail-banks (-2.665-0.061<0 and the difference is 
statistically different from zero) and this rejects H2. Contingent capital is 
estimated to have no impact on risk-taking behaviour of non-too-big-to-fail 
banks – H3 is rejected. That relationship is estimated not to have any impact on 
risk-taking behaviour for too-big–to-fail banks (-32.471+14.925<0, but the 
difference is not statistically different from zero) – H4 is, then rejected. The 
instruments test show that three out of the four instruments are correlated with 
the endogenous variables (SND/RWA, CD/RWA, SND/RWA*TBTF), but there is 
one that is not (CD/RWA * TBTF). Furthermore, results could also be biased once 
the instruments are correlated with the explained variable, as well as in previous 
specifications. 
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Chapter 6 
Robustness check 
As explained in section 4.2., and in addition to the previous analysis. I estimate 
another model, very similar to the first one. This time. I use another measure of 
bank risk-taking, which is based on the idea that the longer the bank fails to 
proceed with its obligations the closer it gets to insolvency. Given that the main 
business of a bank is to lay in money from savers and later provide it to spenders 
(and gain the difference between lending and borrowing interests). I use the book 
variable “Accrued loans past due 90 days” (LPD90D). This variable includes all 
loans which reimbursement date is past due 90 days or more. As explained 
above, whenever a debtor exceeds the payment date more than 90 days and still 
fails to reimburse the capital, the loan might be considered a receivable 
impairment, even though it is subject to professional judgement. 90 days is 
widely believed to be the first impairment signal. 
The estimation equation is the following: 
ቀ௅௉஽ଽ଴஽்஺ ቁ௜௧ =  ߚ0 + ߚ1 ቀ
ௌே஽
ோௐ஺ቁ௜௧ + ߚ2 ቀ
ௌே஽
ோௐ஺ቁ௜௧ כ ܶܤܶܨ௜௧ + ߚ3 ቀ
஼஽
ோௐ஺ቁ௜௧ +
ߚ4 ቀ ஼஽ோௐ஺ቁ௜௧ כ ܶܤܶܨ௜௧ + ߚ5 ቀ
஽஽
்஽ቁ௜௧ + ߚ6 ln(ܶܣ)௜௧ + ߚ7 ቀ
௅௅௉
ேூூ ቁ௜௧ + (
஽
ா)௜௧ + ݒ௜ + ݑ௧, 
where (LPD90D/TA) it refers to the ratio of loans past due 90 days to total 
assets of bank i in year t and the remaining variables have the already known 
descriptions. 
As well as the main model, in this section I will also present the summary 
statistics, a preliminary analysis and the estimation results. 
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6.1. Data description 
As well as in 5.1 this section provides the description of the variables included 
in the robustness check model. Summary statistics are presented in Table 3. 
Variable Mean Median Min Max St. dev.
LPD90D/TA >0.000 0.000 0.000 0.024 >0.000
SND/RWA 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.643 0.008
CD/RWA >0.000 0.000 0.000 0.064 0.000
TBTF (Y/N) 0.009 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.094
SND/RWA * TBTF >0.000 0.000 0.000 0.064 0.002
CD/RWA * TBTF >0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 >0.000
ln(TA) 12.986 12.799 7.690 21.411 1.322
DD/TD 0.128 0.110 0.000 1.000 0.105
D/E 9.594 9.804 -61372.420 12466.750 141.311
LLP/NII 0.093 0.047 -2311.000 53.259 5.227
E/A 0.105 0.093 -0.128 0.998 0.064
Average tax rate 0.249 0.313 -749.091 342.400 2.564
SND of other banks/RWA 755.548 430.687 0.070 754728.700 4650.554
CD of other banks/RWA 1.890 0.000 -0.643 1606.852 13.948
E/A * TBTF 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.448 0.011
Average tax rate * TBTF 0.003 0.000 -6.242 4.033 0.043
SND of other banks/RWA * TBTF 0.014 0.000 0.000 8.275 0.179
CD of other banks/RWA * TBTF 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.000
 
Table 3: Summary statistics of the robustness check model 
Note: all specifications are based on 200.509 observations 
 
I updated the data in order to fit better in the new model. The number of bank 
and the time range is the same I used in the main model. However, after I cleaned 
the data, the number of observations is now 200,509, scattered over 4,257 banks. 
The average bank has a ratio of loans past due 90 days to total assets between 
0.000 and 0.001, a Subordinated Notes and Debentures to Risk-weighted assets 
ratio of 0.001 and a Convertible debt to Risk-weighted assets ratio between 0.000 
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and 0.001. 0.9% of the observations refer to a too-big-to-fail bank.  Concerning 
book values, the average bank has USD 454.298 million of total assets, a demand 
deposits ratio of 0.128, a debt-to-equity ratio of 9.720 and a loan loss provision 
ratio of 0.0877. 
As for the instruments, the average bank has an equity-to-assets ratio of 0.101 
and faces an average tax rate of 0.251. The ratio of Subordinated Notes and 
Debentures of other banks to Risk-weighted assets of the average bank is 660.104 
and the ratio of Convertible debt to Risk-weighted assets is 1.637. 
6.2. Preliminary analysis 
I will use the same approach as I did for the main model. Figures 5-8 show the 
preliminary impact of the four explanatory variables on the new bank-risk 
measure. Note that I used the same approach as before: the graphs show the data 
free of outliers that fall outside the first 99.99% of observations, the same 
percentile as the main model. 
 
Figure 5: Preliminary analysis of the impact of SND/RWA on LPD90D/TA 
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Figure 6: Preliminary analysis of the impact of CD/RWA on LPD90D/TA 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Preliminary analysis of the impact of SND/RWA * TBTF on LPD90D/TA 
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Figure 8: Preliminary analysis of the impact of CD/RWA * TBTF on LPD90D/TA 
 
The results almost replicate the output of main model preliminary analysis. 
Again, we can state that the presence of subordinated debt securities has a 
positive relationship with the number of loans past due 90 days. The same 
analysis is made for too-big-to-fail and non-too-big-to-fail banks. 
Contingent capital, in its turn, shows again no signs of a potential negative (or 
positive) relationship. The reason for this might be the same as for the main 
model – the absence of control variables that could interfere with the impact of 
the explanatory variables (for instance size of debt-to-equity ratio) 
The further section provides the estimation results which might or might not 
corroborate the previous model findings. 
6.3. Estimation results 
This section presents the estimation results of the robustness check model. 
Note that the assumptions and specifications I will use know are the same as I 
did in the main model (see 5.3.) Results are shown in Table 4. 
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LPD90D OLS  IV    
  (i)  (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 
SND/RWA  0.002***  0.021*** -0.001 0.002 -0.040*** 
  (0.000)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) 
CD/RWA  0.001  1.726*** 0.000 0.000 -0.474 
  (0.002)  (0.304) (>0.000) (0.134) (0.325) 
SND/RWA * TBTF 0.003***  -0.009*** 0.004*** 0.001 0.004 
  (0.000)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
CD/RWA * TBTF 0.006  -2.211*** 0.000 -0.665 0.035 
  (0.017)  (0.367) (>0.000) (0.445) (0.312) 
ln(TA)     >0.000*** 0.000*** >0.000*** 
     (>0.000) (0.000) (>0.000) 
DD/TD     >0.000*** >0.000*** 0.000*** 
     (>0.000) (>0.000) (>0.000) 
D/E     >0.000*** >0.000 <0.000 
     (>0.000) (>0.000) (>0.000) 
LLP/NII     0.000* >0.000 >0.000 
     (>0.000) (>0.000) (>0.000) 
Quarter-fixed effects No  No No Yes Yes 
Bank-fixed effects No  No No No Yes 
        
R-Squared  0.003      
Overall F-Test  72.740      
Endogenous variables 
correlation test 
       
     SND/RWA    234.929*** 107.597*** 115.338*** 11.260*** 
     CD/RWA    67.264*** 83.225*** 16.9159*** 7.500*** 
     SND/RWA * TBTF    9389.070*** 2418.590*** 363.494*** 170.220*** 
     CD/RWA * TBTF   3.247*** 676.050*** 2.744*** 0.900 
Overidentification test   25.357*** 40.537*** 111.411*** 21.861*** 
 
Table 4: Estimation results of the robustness check model. All specifications are based on 200,437 
observations. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** denote significant at 
1%, ** denote significant at 5* and * denote significant at 10%. Endogenous variables correlation 
test examines if the instruments are correlated with each of the four endogenous variables. The 
overidentification test examines if the instruments are correlated with the error term. For 
specifications (ii), (iii) and (iv), the test is score chi squared and for specification (v), the test is the 
Hansen J test. 
 
Specification (i) shows that the impact of subordinated debt on risk-taking 
behaviour is significant and positive for non-too-big-to-fail banks. H1 is, then, 
rejected. Regarding the risk-taking behaviour of too-big-to-fail banks, 
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subordinated debt also has a positive impact (0.002+0.003>0, and the difference 
is statistically different from zero). H2 is also rejected. As for contingent capital, 
its impact on non-too-big-to-fail banks is not found statistically significant on too-
big-to-fail banks, which rejects H3. The same occurs for too-big-to-fail banks 
(0.002+0.006>0 but the difference is not statistically different from zero) - H4 is 
rejected too. 
Specification (ii) provides significant coefficients for the four explanatory 
variables. Subordinated debt keeps impacting positively the risk-taking 
behaviour of non-to-big-too-fail banks – H1 remains rejected.  Subordinated debt 
of too-big-to-fail banks is also positive (0.021-0.009>0, with this difference being 
statistically different from zero) – H2 is still rejected. Regarding contingent 
capital, there is a positive impact on risk-taking behaviour of non-too-big-to-fail 
banks. H3 is again rejected. However, there is a negative impact on risk-taking 
behaviour of too-big-to-fail banks (1.726-2.211<0, and the difference is 
statistically different from zero) – H4 is accepted. The analysis of the instruments 
concludes that they are correlated with the endogenous variables but they are 
also correlated with the explained variable. 
Results from specification (iii) shows no statistically significant relationship 
between subordinated debt and risk-taking behaviour for non-too-big-to-fail 
banks. This rejects H1. On contrary, it shows a positive relationship for too-big-
to-fail banks (-0.001+0.004>0, with this difference being statistically different from 
zero) – H2 is rejected. Moving to contingent capital, it has no statistically 
significant impact on risk-taking behaviour of non-too-big-to-fail banks which 
keeps H3 rejected. H4 is also rejected due to the same reason - coefficients for 
contingent capital of both non-too-big-to-fail and too-big-to-fail banks are not 
significant, neither is the difference between them. The instruments remain 
correlated with the endogenous variables but also correlated with the explained 
variable. 
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Results from Specification (iv) state that the relationship between 
subordinated debt and risk-taking behaviour of non-too-big-to-fail banks is 
estimated not to be significant. H1 is still under rejection. The relationship 
between subordinated debt and risk-taking behaviour of too-big-to-fail banks is 
estimated to be positive and significant (0.002+0.001>0, and the difference is 
statistically different from zero). H2 is also rejected. Contingent capital has still 
no statistically significant impact on non-too-big-to-fail bank risk taking which 
maintains H3 rejected. The impact on too-big-to-fail banks is also estimated not 
to be significant (0.000-0.665<0, but this difference is not statistically different 
from zero), which rejects H4. The analysis of the instruments does not change. 
They are still correlated with the endogenous variables and also with the 
explained variable. 
Finally, specification (v) shows that subordinated debt has a negative and 
significant impact on risk-taking behaviour of non-too-big-to-fail banks, which 
validates H1. As for too-big-to-fail banks, the impact is still negative (-
0.040+0.004<0, with this difference being statistically different from zero). H2 is 
rejected. Results for Contingent capital show no statistically significant impact 
on risk-taking behaviour of non-too-big-to-fail banks - this rejects H3. We cannot 
accept H4 neither. Although the impact of contingent capital on risk-taking 
behaviour of too-big-to-fail banks seems negative (-0.474+0.035<0), the difference 
is not statistically different from zero. The instruments analysis show that they 
are correlated with 3 out of 4 endogenous variables (SND/RWA, CD/RWA, 
SND/RWA*TBTF), but not with one of them (CD/RWA * TBTF). Moreover, they 
are also correlated with the explained variable. The interpretation of this results, 
then, should be followed with caution.  
This totally corroborates the results obtained in the previous chapter. In fact 
both models accept H1 and reject H2, H3 and H4. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
The objective of this thesis was to assess the impact of subordinated debt and 
contingent capital on risk-taking behaviour in both too-big-to-fail and non-too-
big-to-fail. To do so, I estimated a model in which the explanatory variable was a 
measure of bank risk taking (earnings volatility) and the explained variables 
were measures of subordinated debt (the ratio Subordinated Notes and 
Debentures over Risk-weighted assets) and contingent capital (ratio of 
Convertible Debt over Risk-weighted assets). I estimated those impacts for both 
too-big-to-fail and non-to-big-to-fail banks, since it is a bank feature that might 
change the market discipline of investors since they know that the government 
does never let a too-big-to-fail fail. 
The results indicated that subordinated debt has a negative impact on risk-
taking behaviour of non-too-big-to-fail banks, which accepts H1. The 
relationship between subordinated debt and risk-taking behaviour is estimated 
to also be negative for too-big-to-fail banks. Therefore, H2 is rejected. No 
statistically evidence was found about the impact of contingent capital on non-
too-big-to-fail and too-big-to-fail banks, which rejects H3 and H4. The results 
must be seen with caution since the instruments are correlated with the explained 
variable. They were corroborated by the robustness check 
The results are limited to the data available. In fact, I found it hard to get 
variables that perfectly describe the behaviour of a true contingent capital 
security. The variable I used (convertible debt) has a similar behaviour once it 
includes debt instruments that converts into capital but could also include other 
equity issue, depending on the bank. Data was also difficult to obtain – I had to 
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make several assumptions that might compromise the reliability of the model. 
One thing that could caught one’s attention is the high number of observations 
that report subordinated debt and contingent capital as zero, which is obviously 
a consequence of the data treatment it was subjected. 
I leave for further research the reasons for the contingent capital 
implementation delay and potential policies and measures that would ensure its 
operating effectiveness.  
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